Doctor in Perry Case Argues He's Just a Drug Dealer, Not a Physician

It’s a strange legal argument to watch unfold: a convicted doctor is essentially asking a federal appeals court to strip him of his medical credentials and treat him like a common street dealer. That’s exactly what Dr. Salvador Plasencia is doing in his appeal of the Matthew Perry ketamine case, and it reveals something uncomfortable about how criminal law carves up intent and culpability.

Plasencia was sentenced to 30 months in prison last year after pleading guilty to four ketamine-distribution counts. Prosecutors alleged he supplied ketamine to Perry in the weeks before the actor’s death. But here’s where his appeal gets creative: Plasencia’s attorneys are arguing that because Perry wasn’t seeking him out for legitimate medical treatment but rather looking for a reliable source of ketamine, Plasencia shouldn’t be punished as a physician who betrayed a patient’s trust. Instead, they’re asking the Ninth Circuit to treat him as a garden-variety drug dealer—which, paradoxically, might result in a lighter sentence.

The logic is counterintuitive but has a certain coherence to it. If you’re claiming you acted as a drug trafficker rather than a doctor, you sidestep the aggravating factor that judges typically pile onto medical professionals who abuse their position. The appeal repeatedly compares Plasencia to the other defendants caught up in the ketamine scandal, arguing his role was closer to that of a drug dealer than a physician providing medical care. He’s also challenging what his lawyers describe as improper double-counting tied to allegations he altered records during the investigation, and he’s arguing he received harsher punishment than co-defendants Mark Chavez and Erik Fleming.

There’s a certain irony here. Plasencia’s defense essentially amounts to: I wasn’t wearing a doctor hat when I committed the crime, so don’t punish me like I was wearing one. Whether that argument gains traction with the appellate court remains to be seen, but it underscores a fundamental tension in criminal justice: how do we measure culpability when professional status is intertwined with criminal conduct?